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The Ideology of Legal Reasoning
in the Classroom
Jay M. Feinman"
The other papers in this symposium stress the importance of expanding
our inquiry into cases such as O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co.' In this
essay I discuss how the process of legal reasoning, as it ordinarily is
conducted in first-year classes, introduces its own element of ideological
distortion. My proposition is that, because of that ideological distortion, the
moves suggested by the other symposiasts are important but limited.
In a first-year class, O'Brien typically would be approached as a case that
requires the court to balance the interests involved: the victim's interest in the
security of her person, the interest of the physician and his employer in being
able to reasonably infer consent to be vaccinated, and the social interest in
promoting vaccination. The Banks, Lande, and Shalleck papers suggest that
we should be performing that balancing procedure in a more enlightened way.
We now understand that there is more at stake in this case than the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court originally thought. In deciding the case, we have
to consider more facts and alternative approaches and listen to different voices
in order to reach an appropriate decision. Perhaps the decision will be the
same, perhaps different, but we will have arrived at the answer through better
methods.
I want to suggest that the process of enlightened decisionmaking is much
harder than that. Even if we employ a pluralistic approach that takes account
of race, class, gender, and economic concerns, many elements of the process
of legal discourse constrain our ability to do the kind of things that the other
authors suggest. Too often, we ignore those constraints in the first-year
classroom.
We see in O'Brien a conflict of interests in a particular setting which
reflects a conflict of social norms. It is very hard to recognize and then to
balance the different kinds of interests raised here, much harder than the other
authors suggest. It is particularly difficult to contest the traditional approach
to this case because of a variety of elements of the legal reasoning process as
it is carried on in the typical torts class. These elements include (1) the
structure of legal doctrine; (2) the pictures that animate the doctrine; (3) the
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden.
This essay is essentially the text I presented at the symposium. I have taken
advantage of the essay format to refrain from citing the burgeoning literature on legal
reasoning relevant to this topic.
1. 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891), reprinted at 57 Mo. L. REv. 347.
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themes and argumentative techniques that run through the doctrine; and (4) the
limited attention to the effects of legal process. These elements interact in
complex ways in the practice of legal discourse. None of them determines the
result in the case, but each of them influences its outcome. In the remainder
of the paper I will briefly describe each of them and discuss how they are
implicit in O'Brien.
I. LEGAL DOCTRINE
The most obvious element of the legal reasoning process that structures
our inquiry is legal doctrine-the rules, principles, and authorities relevant to
the decision of the case. Of course, because we are all enlightened post-
realists, we know that the doctrine does not decide the case. Nevertheless, as
Maitland, the great scholar of English legal history said, "Taught law is tough
law."2 The basic understanding of law that we acquire in the process of legal
education has a profound influence on our approach and ultimately on our
decisions in cases such as this one, and the doctrinal structure is the crucial
element of that legal learning.
We begin with a basic level of doctrinal distinction. O'Brien involves
the tort of battery, an intentional tort to the person. We have a body of
learning which flows from that distinction to suggest a range of appropriate
resolutions to such issues. Suppose we decide that this case should be treated
under the law of trespass-a mixed tort/property concept-instead of battery.
We would have then redefined the interest of the plaintiff, from a tort interest
in personal security to a property interest in her body. The law of trespass
provides more stringent requirements for intentional invasion of a property
interest than the law of battery does for a personal security interest.
Oidinarily, an actor does not have a right to invade someone else's property
interest simply because the actor proceeds under a reasonable but mistaken
belief of consent, unless the mistake is caused by the property owner's
conduct. 3 This difference between the law of battery and the law of trespass
introduces the possibility of limiting the physician's claim of privilege in
O'Brien. The traditional doctrinal characterization pushes us in one direction
in evaluating the interests involved in the case; moving to a different doctrinal
characterization would make it a different case.
The effects of the doctrine can be seen at a different doctrinal level as
well. O'Brien is an intentional tort case taught within the subject of
privileges. We teach the rule that consent privileges what would otherwise be
an intentional tort. In particular, O'Brien illustrates the rule that the law
2. FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 18
(1901).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 (1986).
[Vol. 57
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focuses not on the subjective consent of the victim, but on the physician's
objective interpretation of her consent from the surrounding circumstances as
the court sees them. That rule is usually explained, as it is in this opinion, as
an almost-inevitable product of the interest balancing. An enlightened teacher
might even link this rule to the general rise of objective standards, in contract
as well as in tort.
Suppose, however, that we were to reverse the position of the parties
under the doctrine. Suppose that uniformly we are concerned with the
subjective consent of victims of force. Even if there are objective manifesta-
tions of consent, the objective manifestations are trumped by her lack of
subjective consent. In this case, we quickly reach issues such as those
involved in the related controversy over consent to rape.4 Of course, this
approach would render a much, much different reading of the case. We would
have a more favorable view of the victim's interest, an approach which is
made less available by the traditional doctrine's structuring of the inquiry.
II. PICTURES
A second element of legal reasoning is what I like to think of as pictures
that are represented in cases-pictures about what happens in the world and
the normative consequences of those events.5 There are, in fact, fancier terms
for those pictures; they can be referred to as paradigms, prototypes, or
idealized cognitive models; but the essential notion in all of these terms is the
same. We don't come to this case, with all of its possibilities for factual and
normative interpretation, fresh, new, and with a clean slate. Instead, we begin
reading the opinion (or the court begins listening to the lawyer's arguments,
or the lawyers begin thinking about the case) and pictures immediately jump
into our heads. The pictures are descriptions of factual settings in an idealized
but concrete form, and the pictures carry with them normative implications for
the way in which we approach those factual settings.
Consider two examples of the kirids of pictures that are involved in
O'Brien: the picture of intentional tort and the picture of individualism. The
picture of an intentional tort is summoned up by the description of battery,
typically (and not coincidentally) the first intentional tort discussed in the torts
course:
A simple and workable definition of the modem concept of battery is
the intentional, unprivileged, and either harmful or offensive contact with
the person of another. The basic parameters of the battery concept are best
4. See SUSAN EsTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
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described by a hypothetical example. Assume that A is walking along the
sidewalk and sees B, whom A dislikes intensely, approaching from the
opposite direction. A strikes B on the jaw with his fist, knocking out three
of B's teeth and rendering him unconscious.
6
When torts professors teach this picture, they inevitably point out that it
is only a prototype, and that there are many other kinds of batteries and other
kinds of intentional torts that radiate from it. A battery, for example, can arise
from a simple offensive touching and does not have to involve serious
physical injury. But the picture of someone punching someone else as the
prototype of an intentional tort is so powerful that as we move away from
cases that closely resemble the prototype, it becomes harder and harder to
think of them as intentional torts.
One of the things lurking in the background in O'Brien is the effect of
describing battery by way of this picture rather than by way of a formal,
Restatement-like, black letter definition. There is some resistance to treating
this case as a battery, even though it may meet the formal definition, because
it departs from the prototypical picture. The physician's act here simply isn't
like punching someone. We understand that battery is a technical concept and
that an unconsented touching, even if it is non-violent and does no immediate
physical harm, constitutes a battery. Nonetheless, we easily intuit this case as
a battery.
We can see the significance of these pictures and their interaction with
other forms of value distortion by particularly focusing on cases involving
women. Many of the indignities women suffer are not seen as tortious in part
because the law consistently privileges the interests and perceptions of men
over those of women. In part, however, this situation occurs because the
privileging is expressed through pictures of tortious behavior that accord with
the experiences of men, at least as they are perceived by the dominant view
of male and female roles. Being punched is the sort of injury easily
understood by men; being verbally abused is less frequently encountered by
them and, according to the traditional view of the stoic male, less easily
understood as seriously injurious. Therefore, the ordinary abuses women
suffer in everyday life-being verbally harassed by construction workers,
having suggestive remarks made about their bodies-simply don't fit the
picture of a tort.
The second kind of picture that we see in O'Brien is the picture we might'
characterize as individualism. What does the court see going on in the world
in general? This court sees a picture entirely consistent with everything we
know about the law of the period, the period of classical legal thought. We
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have a world of isolated individuals, each of whom may act as he chooses, so
long as he (and the "he" is really powerful here) does not invade the sphere
of personal autonomy and integrity of another; the picture often used to
express this social vision is the picture of the market. So we start out with the
presumption that the physician and the victim are somehow separate, and the
physician can do anything so long as he doesn't violate the victim's rights.
There is, of course, an alternative picture: the notion of relationship described
in Professor Shalleck's paper, the world in which people start out not with
rights against each other, but responsibilities towards each other, often
embodied in the picture of the family. Here that picture would suggest that
the physician should take greater care for the situation of the victim.
III. THEMES AND ARGUMENTS
A third element of legal reasoning includes the themes that flow
throughout legal argument and the forms in which they are typically
expressed. There are some general issues which run throughout the law, and
we see the courts using them, explicitly or implicitly, over and over in
familiar ways. These themes and forms of argument are the basis for what we
ordinarily think of as "policy argument."
The court obviously is concerned about the reasonableness of the
physician's action. Underlying that concern is a theme of autonomy. If the
court was to develop this theme, it might talk about the necessity of protecting
the physician's freedom of action, because protecting freedom of action
encourages people to engage in socially productive behavior. People should
not have to fear that they are going to be subject to legal liability or suffer
some other terrible consequence for doing reasonable acts in everyday life.
A first difficulty with this argument is that it ignores the victim's concern
for autonomy-the autonomy not to be vaccinated, the autonomy not to suffer
this kind of indignity. A second difficulty is that the physician's interest in
autonomy is met by the victim's interest in security-the security of her
person. And these difficulties multiply the more the argument continues. We
use themes and argumentative moves of this sort constantly, as if they had
independent validity. However, we seldom understand the way that they
relate to each other, and the extent to which they are inconsistent and
contradictory.
IV. LEGAL PROCESS
Finally, the fourth element of legal reasoning is that it is not exclusively
an intellectual process; instead, it is a social process situated in what we
ordinarily think of as the legal process. Even if we are willing to take into
account a broad range of considerations in deciding these cases, we know that
the way the legal process works sometimes structures how much and in what
1992]
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manner we take those facts and things into account. We know this, but very
often we forget it, or at least put it aside in discussions of cases as doctrine,
as we would discuss O'Brien in a first-year torts course. Consider two aspects
of the legal process: access to lawyers and lawyers' professional training and
orientation.
As Professor Shalleck discusses, O'Brien is a puzzling case in terms of
how it came to court. It is not clear how serious a physical injury is involved,
so the amount of damages to be gained may be small, especially discounted
by the risk of loss where the outcome is so unpredictable. Further, the case
arises out of the immigrant community in the 1890s in Boston, and the bar
that served that community was still undeveloped. Yet this case comes to
court and is litigated to the highest court in the jurisdiction. We would expect
that there are many, many cases like this which never appeared in the courts.
The structure of the legal profession, the economics of the legal profession,
and the nature of what lawyers think of as contestable claims have a great deal
to do with the possibilities for opening legal discourse discussed in the other
papers in this symposium.
A second limiting dimension of the legal process is that even assuming
a would-be plaintiff finds a lawyer, she still finds a lawyer. That is, lawyers
typically are trained in certain ways, so that they see problems in certain ways.
Most fundamentally, lawyers' perceptions of problems are shaped by the
doctrine, pictures, themes, and arguments discussed above. Having seen the
problems in these ways, the lawyers then tell certain stories about them. They
tell these stories if they are good lawyers in part because they recognize who
their audiences are. In many cases lawyers have two audiences: they have
a lay audience (the jury) and a professional audience (the judge). They have
to find a way of telling the story that will bring out the kind of reality that is
talked about, but will fit the constraints of what the judge will allow the jury
to hear. Thus it is hardly surprising that O'Brien's story was submerged in
the legal process and only now is retold by Professor Banks.
In short, I applaud the effort to open up our understanding of cases such
as O'Brien to other voices, but while we are doing that, we also need to focus
on the process of legal reasoning itself, as a mode of discourse and as a
product of the legal process in which it is situated. Without that additional
focus, we will find it difficult to open ourselves fully to different voices and
new approaches, and difficult to teach our students the three things that we
ought to be teaching them.
First, we ought to teach students an understanding of what the law is and
the way it works. Yet an understanding of the law based on doctrine or policy
as it usually is presented is fundamentally misleading. "The way law
works"-law as a practice among lawyers and judges and others in the
world-depends much more heavily on the privileging of certain stories, on
the structure of legal discourse, and on the context of the legal process than
it does on doctrine or policy as those are usually conceived and presented.
[Vol. 57
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Second, we ought to teach our students that law is a realm of moral
discourse. Ordinarily, we flip our students back and forth between the two
poles of certainty and cynicism; either the law is fixed or the law is meaning-
less. In fact, we are somewhere in the middle, and opening up the possibili-
ties of different interests and different moral positions on these issues
empowers our students as moral agents.
Third, we ought to train our students to be lawyers. Good lawyers
understand both the manipulability of facts (and the limits on manipulation)
and the constraints and structures that they have to employ as good lawyers
to achieve desirable results for their clients.
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